ACP: al-Din Dal Prikaz? A Matter For Consideration

10 October 2026.

'And who gives the order? You, or the Party!'

—A Bureaucrat Rebukes the Leader

Prefatory Addendum

Our previous article [this one herein] regarding the chairmanship of the American Communist Party was a correct though uncomfortable piece. But why was it, as we say, uncomfortable?

Of course, some of the discomfort was of an internal nature. We felt ourselves very close to violating the ghost of Reform, for instance simply by covering the status of a fellow party's leadership, and their very leader, nay less! Then there was the anxiety not to impose around the whole context of the treatment a Reform-Leninist framework; the party is not a Reformed Communist (Reform-Leninist) party. Naturally, some or many of our concerns are tied to the studies and developments of Reform, thus had we to maintain a mindful estimation in offering our observations. Both of these concerns have the long shadow of the Comintern behind them, giving us a perspiring reminder to have a care in all this.

The outlook and plausible verdict are, in the case of the American Communist Party, exceedingly fickle to forecast, particularly because of the central personalities expressed in the leadership's demeanour. We seem to recall Comrade Garrido so much as insinuating that the cultivation of personality, especially bolstered by social media, was indeed a party strategy. Unlike Thoughts of a Comrade, which possesses an apparat of nay personality, a cult of personality(ies!) is an inherently opaque thing, as opaque as reading any man during a performance. Will Comrade al-Din pass any communiques or draft any resolutions, any speeches or articles leading towards it when he decides to change his mind, or make a novel metaphysical discovery? My pity to any scholars and journalists entering the study of Hazology. Mere ACP Watching is not nearly comparable to that beast.

That is precisely why Thoughts of a Comrade has attempted to hold the balance of critique and congratulation. The American Communist Party is little different, in our view, than a smaller, more controlled USSR or PRC, id est an experiment. Some are deathly afeard of experimentation, turning their noses at it, and others tolerate only a few mistakes before turning their backs— the point, is to see the latest stages of the experiment possible, that a firm grasp over all the evolutions may be accessed for study. In that way, the American Communist Party is a gift, not to be squandered by arrogant squabbling, but to be observed calmly and studied. That is what we foremostly hope to do. Yet the previous article [the following text herein] was a consideration for emendation is, too, a part of study.

We are appalled by some of the uncomradely treatment, and dare we say intentional lies towards the American Communist Party, but we also harbour our own concerns and chastisings. In the end, it is a matter of comradeship and balance. Though, I will say for myself, that I will be glad to have a respite from discussing parties for the moment.

ACP: al-Din Dal Prikaz?

We are treading upon hypocritically dangerous ground in the composition of this article. On the one hand, Reform-Leninism is supposed to be anti-International-ist, for meddling in fellow parties' affairs has never led to aught but uncomradeliness, sectarianism, dogmatism, and a confusion of grounded, material analysis regarding conditions in the real world— that is to say outside the USSR-bound Comintern and the depressing, insular world of trivial micro-sects. Yet, on the other hand, does Marx's and Engels' exhortation to 'not disdain to conceal our views' not apply equally or more so to communists speaking honestly for their comrades? Furthermore, is not one of the slogans of Reform likely precise in its affirmation 'let a hundred tulips bloom; let us find out what is true'? Certainly, it must be a duty of Reformed Communists to be forthright in our views?

Be this as it may, we begin by stating in the preliminary that this article contains neither critique nor request: it is merely a work focussed in observation, for any one with an interest to consider. We also state in the preliminary that nay observation recorded herein is made in malice, or any such an attitude of strife. This separates the present article from others relating to parties previous published in Thoughts of a Comrade.

To capitulate the end of our coverage of American Communist Party events and material, we will take a look at the outspoken force at the top. Eventually, we may offer commentary again on this party, particularly on Red America, the theoretical organ of the party, and next year's Marxism Conference. With that explicated— the American Communist Party, namely its leadership, is of course the object of discussion in this article. The American Communist Party has proved promising in general direction, having smashed through thick panes of dogma, and creating a very intriguing monthly print publication. The collaboration betwixt this party, the Platypus Society, and the Green Party for Marxism Conference 2026 is a credit to all three of them. Comrade Garrido is doing excellent theoretical work which has flouted the usual dogmatic pretensions of such atmospheres.

But within the aura of this brilliant haze is a smudge, a black spot which could grow to devour the whole star of the party if it is not to be sufficiently addressed. The Chairman of the American Communist Party, Comrade Haz al-Din, is a difficult profile to discuss. Even so must it be discussed for the good of the party itself. Comrade al-Din, as far as either of us know, began his political career as an Internetwork streamer, and alas, some of his 'persona'— that outwrath-baiting, idiosyncratic search for grosser levels of engagement which streamers make their income in relation to —has appeared to follow Comrade al-Din, even into his new office as Chairman. In fairness to Comrade al-Din, he conceptualises a successful movement as typically arising from a 'sect of a sect', as he recently told some critics in support of the Democratic Socialists of America. This view is more tolerant of and probably dependent upon a personality that should otherwise be considered 'abnoral' for the standard of that given venue. It is also, therefore, naturally more tolerant of what we consider to be the revolutionary leader cult.

Very well, Comrade al-Din may intentionally be deploying an idiosyncratic persona to maintain interest and cohesion in the sect, in this case the party. And has not Thoughts of a Comrade suggested instituting an isolated gemeanship for the recultivation of organic intellectual tradition(s) and high culture? Indeed we have formulated just such a necessity, inspired as we have been by the teachings of the prophets of post-liberalism, every day discovering yet the more Marxist antecedents to these ideas. Comrade al-Din is therefore merely putting Thoughts of a Comrade's propounded theory into practise! So it could be argued, and perhaps not unreasonably.

What, then, is the concern, exactly? There are two problems, one institutional regarding ideal conduct, and one personal regarding theoretical basis (and the acceptable bounds of novelty). Both problems are unified in the manhood of one Haz al-Din. The institutional problem is the more serious in our view, but relies upon the initial context of the personal problem, so we must go in an inverse order.

As we have attested in the two articles prior to this one, Comrade al-Din seems to be much more invested in or influenced by his personal idealist project than by any current or study of Marxism. His knowledge of Soviet history likewise exhibits a peculiar idealist narrative, dare we say a downright gnostic pseudo-revelation, divorced from any generally accepted facts of the historical consensus. We have never before heard the claim that, far from proposing it, Comrade Lenin was actually opposed to the New Economic Policy from day one! That the NEP was a Trotskyite-Bukharinite-Zinovievite Centre-Bloc plot to betray the soviets, the peasantry, and socialism altogether is certainly news to me, and I am sure it should have been curious news to Vladimir Ilyich as well. Of course, Thoughts of a Comrade exhibits and promotes a few idiosyncrasies of its own (we will soon come to the institutional question, however), far be it for us to reach for such a criticism with stones.

Never the less, is there not an operative question of extremity in the determination of ideological basis? That is to say plainly: how little do one's ideas need to have a basis in Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Marxist debates and traditions to be considered predominantly Marxist thoughts? But are not we all deviationist-revisionists at the end of it? Thus, the question must be in part one of extent, and perhaps, practically speaking, of one's rhetorical choice in presenting the ideas. Whether one thinks intellectual genealogy an exercise in self-serving hero worship or a genuine endeavour towards enlightenment of conception, it is a necessary marker for these determinations. Does, in a sole enquiry, history turn through social revolution generated by the conditions and relations of class struggle, or does history progress via hocus-pocus shelf-theology, revealed from the Wind of the Absolute, whose name in the case of Comrade al-Din happens to be 'Allah', and whose true prophet, we might suggest, is Orthodox Imam al-Dugien— not Lenin, not Stalin, not even Kalinin, Bukharin, or Trotsky, but Dugin. Although Comrade al-Din attempts to Marxify this civilisational theory, it still looks closer to something Dugin should posit than Marx et alia should. That is our point. I like Spengler and Deneen, but their insights always bow before those of Marxists in my mind.

Now, some may, in an earnest enquiry nay less, wonder whether we are here engaging in some tried and trite Bolshevik double-speak. It was not so long ago that we were pelted with accusations of representing a perverse ,,Deneenian national socialism''. Adopt even a single idea from a non-Marxist source, and the Yezhovite termites are wont to come frothing out of the woodwork. So what is our criterion for suggesting such things? It comes down to a question of ideological basis and consistence. Who follows whom? What is comprising the 'base' of one's ideology, and what the 'superstructure'? In asking this question about Comrade al-Din, one must contend whether the majority of his conceptions are derived from the basic theory of Marxists, or from the pontifications of Hegelian idealists, Islamic and Gnostic theologians, and Duginist civilisational determinists. Which group's analysis is the more often subservient to the other? The same question ought to be raised against liberals

However, there is another question which must be deliberated even alongside this, as we have delineated. In complete contrast to the kind of organisation Thoughts of a Comrade is, fulfilling the role of independent comrades as we are, Comrade al-Din occupies the highest office of leadership in a self-professed vanguard party, as Chairman of the American Communist Party. This occupancy applies a different nature to the question of proper theory and conduct. A streamer, a dilettante, an academic, a journalist, even a theologican or an officer of state, can be useful Marxist comrades, existing around our trustworthy core of party revolutionists, apparatchiks, and cadres. Some could argue persuasively that the former non-party strata are subordinate in utility to those of the institutional party proper, but none could argue well, we think, a case that these two groups are the same thing, with the same duties and expectations. An idiosyncratic theorist who expects his own blend of ideas to be hailed as the vanguard ideology of a movement is hopelessly deluded. Expectations are maintained through a wide complex of notions and duties, always.

We thus approach now a thorny question: what exactly are the duties and expectations of the office of Chairman of the American Communist Party, or if these are as yet not ascertained, how might they be compiled? Reform-Leninism, in its anti-International-ist tendency, blocks off the traditional, dogmatic method of ascribing a universal principle for all ,,true communist'' parties to follow. What did the Communist International really achieve besides turning mere disagreements and substantial factional divisions irreconcilably hostile? That is why there is a sole acceptable conclusion, which this whole article has been revolving around: only the American Communist Party, both leadership and membership, may determine this question, id est of Comrade al-Din's public conduct.

As we intimated at the beginning, we had nay intention from the first of 'giving the prikaz' either this way or that. We will note our personal view in a moment. Howbeit, our personal view of a 'foreign' matter will remain just that. Some may call this cowardice, others may deride it as unrigoured laziness. We hold these criticisms immaterially disregarded, for the alternative is to devolve oneself into senseless sectarian strife, and that courts invitation to the Yezhovite mind-set. Sometimes, limitation is merely the virtue of restraint in its natural formation. And party sovereignty is both right and necessary, anywise.

Well then, what should Thoughts of a Comrade have done, were it our party to do with? As for the previous question, we do not believe Comrade al-Din's pet idiosyncratic ramblings to befit the ideological education or the proper character of a party chairman. Were Comrade al-Din merely a collective leader, one member of the Executive Board amongst many, then his sermons should not be so intolerable in their embarrassment and confusion. We originally had hoped that Comrade al-Din should soon become bored with the serious and mundane affairs of party bureaucracy— bureaucratic socialism being our vision of successful socialism, of course, as opposed to Comrade al-Din's preferred fashion of the revolutionary leader cult and grand performances. Yet we have since altered our opinion, for it seems that Comrade al-Din does possess a certain propaganda talent relating to otherwise elusive strata. He seems to be the communist version of both Mark Pellagrino and Hasan Piker, in terms of stratum outreach (this is a crude analogy, but hopefully understandable). Moreover, Comrade al-Din has dispelled our concern, in proving himself to be more committed to the party than we had then anticipated. That is further why we should not be in favour of Comrade al-Din be removed from leadership as such: only removed from the chairmanship. He is a comrade and a productive asset, so the removal *is not a matter of discipline per se, but of 'skill-set maximalisation'.

If you take some one out, some one must go back in. This will easily be the most tendentious section of the article, thus we again repeat that there is nay critique nor request to be found in any single sentence of this article, including this forthcoming part. The American Communist Party is a sovereign institution whose cadres are the only ones truly capable of deciding what is best for their own party. Now, if we had to appoint one of the other Executive Board members to the office of Chairman, our initial choice should be... none. The Executive Board, if we are correct, is nay more than fifteen or twenty men, which is still small enough not to warrant this kind of centralised office amongst collective leadership. All this office should do at such a count is tempt a revolutionary leader cult and heighten personality conflicts. Even if the body were not too small, Reform has taught us that collective leadership bodies within larger ones are nearly as effective, but far superior in their lack of potential dangers. What with modern technologies and advanced, sophisticated bureaucracies, there is a lesser need, perhaps little need indeed, for a one-man office of this sort, or 'functional autocracy' as it might be called.

As all of that stands, we will not evade this interrogation in the way that we have (potentially) side-stepped the others in this article. From the bits that we have seen of the party leadership's character and method, we might suggest either Comrade Khrachvik or Comrade Pettis for the position. Both appear to be humble in personality and prudent in their speech. These two traits are ideal in any office with not merely centralised function, but as well centralised authority. Comrade Trotsky serves as a counter-point of a warning, for as we know, he did not heed this necessity: in having stepped upon many comrades toes and having exuded tireless domineering arrogance, some kind of retribution was almost guaranteed by his character. The extreme lesson is that best learnt, is it not? Comrade al-Din is too divisive in his manner, which puts the whole operation at risk upon the basis of his personality. Comrade who are restrained and pragmatically deliberate are called for here, that is our view.

There is one final caveat to address in all this, however. Comrade al-Din is a mannish being, capable of learning and evolution. And to his credit, he has indeed become more professional with time, especially since his rowdy 'beer-hall' streaming days, as we might liken them. Not that either of us ever watched these livestreams, so we may go only off of the few clips and horror stories which rose to our attention. The real question simply is whether Comrade al-Din is continuing to improve in these areas. If so, then perhaps a change in chairmanship is unnecessary, and if not, then for the good of the collective regime, a minor regime change may be in order. For our chief duty, comrades, is to preserve the party and the social institution it represents.

In this regard, the cadres of the American Communist Party need only make a single estimation, that being how long the party can sufficiently compensate for the disturbance wrought by Comrade al-Din, until he reaches an adequate calibre of restrain, an agreeable enough demeanour. Did al-Din 'dal prikaz', or does the party order need to step in? In other words, how many faulty orders must the general staff countermand ere they simply start giving the orders themselves? This defeats the purpose of appointing a field marshal in the first place.

A very final, brief note. We did not consider Comrade Garrido to be an optimal replacement for Chairman because we deemed him much too essential for the Education Department. Removing him from the office of Education Secretary to that of Chairman should do such probable violence far in excess of whatever gain by instituting the shuffle. Disrupting the excellent work being done by Comrade Garrido on the educational front is not a worthy trade, it should be a dismal one. Likewise for Comrade Helali and the significant achievements made in diplomatic relations under his International Secretaryship.