Commentary on The Constitution of The American Communist Party

14 December 2025.

Note: to reduce the amount of line breaks and general clutter, I will be deviating and diverting from the TOAC Party Line on paragraphs (line breaks and indents), using this symbol (￠) at the beginning of a new paragraph for the same article/section instead. I had much to commentate on, and sometimes had to cover multiple topics in one article/section, so hopefully this makes for easier reading.

The Constitution of the American Communist Party may be found here.

Because I had commentary to give on most articles, a Table of these should be most unwieldy. If looking for a specific article, search for it with the format Article [Y]: Section [X], using Roman numerals for both (unless it contains a sub-section, which uses a number and letter, such as 'Section 1A') and a space betwixt the colon and the S.

-I. Preface on The Commentary

Here it is, the long belaboured for commentary on the ACP's party constitution. A word on why it took so long, if I may. Simple enough to say, I fell into the hole of learning more before I speak, which is the fiend of embarking upon every project. If everyone were to wait until they had read every pertinent book, article, and scribble, then nay new books, thus knowledge, should ever be contributed to society.

￠Eventually, I intend to return to this document for a more informative examination, but until then, this analysis of mine on the various sections of the Constitution will make up the present article. The final thing I will say, ere we begin, is that it may be of use or interest to the reader that he read my Commentary on the Programme of the American Communist Party (here). Actually, the Programme is another document I wish to revisit for comment at some distant point.

￠Unlike the Commentary on the Party Programme, which included a prolegomena, the quarter for general observation and my primary focus in writing this commentary is to be consigned to a separate article, which will hopefully be published nay later than a week from to-day.

I. Introductory Paragraphs of The Constitution

Paragraph I. Ah, the controversial 'United States and Canada' policy line. Strictly from the vantage of getting things done and organising efficiently, I am inclined to believe that trying to spread the Party across both lands is inadvisable.

￠There is even the argument, which I, as a New English nationalist am sympathetic to, that the parties of the US ought to be further divided at least betwixt North and South, the grossest of hostilities within the Prison-House ,,Union''. This is not just argued on the grounds of polarised political misfunction, social strife and mistrust, cultural preservation, and national liberation, but as well upon the much more Marxist ground of differing material conditions, if not differing modes of production.

￠Even if the ACP without any doubt had enough resources to compensate for whatever difficulty might be experienced by a party having to operate in two sovereign lands, also possessing different forms and structures of government, there remains the question of comradely respect. How should both the Canadian parties and the Canadian masses respond if a scenario were to arise where the ACP is competing with these domestic Canadian parties? The Comintern was already hopelessly flawed, but this is a stupidly crisis-prone concoction. I must assert truthfully, that if it comes to civil/general war, I pray New England to side properly, and repulse these ACP neo-Fenians from our Canadian brethren's fatherland, as I pray they should do for us if a Confederate or Mexican party were ever to seek the domination of New England.

￠Now, to humour a foreseeable, indeed a historic communist rebuttal, that if Canada is not taken during the revolution or civil war, it will become a permanent base of reactionary opposition and imperialist aggression. It is a secretly held view on most of the communist Left that Comrade Lenin was wrong and Comrade Stalin was right regarding the national sovereignty question.

￠Though I am not presently certain on what the correct view to the general question is, three thoughts come to my mind:

I. The socialist system, in whatever form it takes, ought to be strong enough to to withstand foreign powers, so a hostile Canada could serve to strengthen a US socialist state, also preventing complacency or corruption.

II. If Canada truly proves to be a problem, once the civil war is over, we could just spread some 'permanent revolution', as it were, with our Red Army of the Free. The Commonwealth will possibly become involved if Canada has a revolution, anywise, making a quick 'liberation' preferable (if the ACP is irredeemably set on being a social-imperialist murderer of Canada and New England).

III. I should suggest a study of Menshevik-controlled Georgia and the Finnish Civil War to determine what the correct answer to this question may be. I mean, of course, an objective study of the question, not a memorisation of Soviet justifications after the fact. I certainly do not have one either way to advocate.

￠'Aspires to be the leading political force of the whole people': it is excellent to see some realism and modesty in a communist constitution for once. Certainly, this was not the case in the Soviet Constitution of 1977, where the party and state are always doing what is right and representing the will of the Folk. Should the party ever fall to corruption or make a grave miscalculation, cadres of the ACP now have some Constitutional precedent which they can appeal to.

Paragraph II. 'The Party upholds and strives to deepen the American Revolutionary Tradition': well, the ACP definitely stands up for what it believes in, even at the cost of controversy on, to me, a minor point. I do not know at the moment whether the ACP promotes this historical/historiographical interpretation for reasons of propaganda value or out of a scientific theoretical conviction. At the very least, nay one can accuse them of deviating from and revising orthodox Marxism in this, but by matter of degree perhaps.

￠Speaking of scientific theory and orthodox Marxism, let us give a word on how congruent it might be with Comrades Marx and Engels. The affirmation that 1776 was a burgher revolution is sensible. It is generally accepted that Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin held this view.

￠The questionable (in)congruence comes from the claim to be 'deepening' a burgher revolution; does this, for instance, mean completing the burgher revolution by liquidating the remaining semi-feudal elements in the South, establishing a supreme, unitary legislature in place of the Congress, or initiating a social-democratic phase of the burgher revolution, as a bridge to the first stage of the transition to socialism? The second and third potential incongruences lay in the implication that the same entity of state as that of the current US Federal State is to be primary tool for the construction of socialism. Officially, it should be a wholly new state, but if the new state machinery is more or less modelled on that of the previous state, then has the state machinery really been smashed? Has not the Party in this scenario just reinvented, to take hold of, the burgher state or aspects thereof? Of this, Comrades Marx, Engels, et alia should not approve.

￠A small observation of mine, but one way the ACP could have possibly mitigated this backlash is by using 'committee of correspondence' as a code-word for soviet/council, and 'tea party' for insurrection and the destruction of capital (et cetera, many examples). Thus, this usage of 'revolutionary tradition' would be turned into an equally subversive nod, better acceptable to the comrades broadly, all the while remaining perfectly innocent, even 'patriotic' to the uneducated American. The second line, howbeit, I still find unsalvageable. The Party could have, at the very least, used the term commonwealth in place of 'republic'.

￠Obviously, as a New English nationalist, I can not agree with the sentiment of this paragraph. For me, the year 1776 is that which led down the road to tyranny, indecency, redneckery, cultural degeneracy, and the Federal Prison of Nations. I am not, on the other hand, the target audience in this use of rhetoric, so to criticise the Constitution in relation to this sentiment should feel a bit unfair.

￠Mentioning this, I do wonder whether the US Constitution will get a similar congratulatory reference. If it does, the ACP should be lying either way: to its comrades about its socialist commitments, or to its 'patriotic' readers about its intentions for the burgher Constitution.

Paragraph III. 'The emergence of a new mode of production': this is not as clear as it perhaps ought to be. Is this referring to the socialist or proto-socialist/centralised mode of production, or does the ACP adhere to one of those theories of some even more exploitative mode after capitalism, such as an 'imperialist' or 'financialist' mode of production? I personally hold the proto-socialist/centralised view (videre licet, bank bail-outs, Amazon and Wal-Mart centralised planning, general state interference, so on).

Paragraph IV. A year ago, I might have made more of a sneering jab at the ACP not using for its motto workers of the world unite, or some variation of it. I think it could be easy, though uncomradely and without utility, to foment a storm about how this motto is proof of the ACP's abandonment of 'orthodox Marxism-Leninism' in favour of becoming a futurist (and of course ,,revisionist'') cult. But this is now the Netlog of the Four Nosts and Stroikas— which demand serious study —not of senseless polemic or performative theatric.

￠All I may honestly say is that there is nothing unusual or bad in 'the future belongs to the working class' itself, even if some should consider it in the same spirit as 'the fire rises' and other fascist slogans. This could indicate that it is unappealing, though I am not able to otherwise judge the quality of sloganeering displayed therein.

Paragraph V. 'Building an American state' seems like it could be considered an unfortunate turn of phrase for a communist party, demonstrating just one more reason why the American national line of the ACP is so contentious. There is very good historical justification, being strengthened still, for hearing this as a call to social-imperialist designs.

￠I just want a party that openly calls for either legal sovereignty through secession, or practical sovereignty through restoration of the Articles of Confederation (if only as piece-meal amendments to the mistopian Federal Constitution). The latter option is, of course, the more 'politically correct' one to-day, and is effectively close enough to sovereignty.

￠New England shall not be free under Federal tyranny. Ideally, socialists ought to start with the institution of Magna Carta, the Articles of Confederation, and the Bill of Rights, whether pre- or post-revolution and civil war, building the new document of state from there (altered as needed to accommodate a socialist system).

￠I do agree with and am quite pleased by this recognition that 'building a communist party... depends upon the unification of disparate elements'. This sentence suggests a level of, if I may say it, glasnost for both Party cadres and socialist society. It does not guarantee such a defence against dogmatic repression and tyranny, but it does provide a precedent to argue from if this ever becomes a problem.

￠Further in favour of this point, it hopefully is aimed at officially recognising the equal role of other classes (the intelligentsia and peasantry), and the potential utilisation of or truces with others (aristocrats, clergymen, and dissenting smallburghers and Rightists). This paragraph, in my view, captures some of the things which make the ACP an interesting, perhaps in respects promising influence/player on the Left.

II. Main Articles and Sections of The Constitution

Article I: Section I. 'The American Communist Party recognises one communist party within... the United States and Canada': This confirms, I feel, the fears I have just expressed regarding the likely alienation of our Canadian comrades with this unseemly Americuckfederate social-imperialist attitude adopted by many leaders in the ACP. At this point, if the ACP and the Communist Party of Canada, or the ACP-led United States and present Canada were to go to war, as a loyal Yankee ally, I should help our Canadian brethren drive the redneck Fenians from our fatherlands to the sea.

￠'So Union Jack, and Maple Leaf, Red Hand, and our Pine Flag, to fly against the redneck scum, will dare trench, flame, and crag' is it not sung? Once more, as a New English nationalist, I have grave concerns already about what it is that the ACP may intend to do against outspoken Anti-Federalists like myself. Will the snow have to start singing The Kommissar's Red Polkka as reeds pick ACP Blue-Tops from the pine-line?

How many ACPD Chekists does it take to turn up the heat in the woods? Will Boston's walls be made sieged, its flames lighting up the sky, as had Kronstad's so many years ago? There is the unhelping fact that 'Haz the Khannish Hun' is, or hopefully was in the past, the way that the Chairman of the ACP styled his title.

￠Now, I should like to infer how this will impact the US political sphere as it currently stands. Obviously, whilst the Canadian parties will have ample reasons to be angered with this stance of the ACP Constitution, the other US parties, indeed the US as a whole, will be negatively impacted by it, too. I am more fearful that the US communist movement has grown to accept such insidious exclusivist— in practical reality isolationist —ignorance.

￠One thing I rely on Worker's Vanguard for, the organ of the Spartacists, officially the International Communist League, is analysis of and response to other Leftist groups and currents. Monthly Review allows me, in a similar manner, to hear from various currents on the Left directly.

Depending on how loosely or harshly the ACP apparat decides to enforce this aggressively anti-pluralist view, ACP cadres might find themselves in a dangerous situation, and might feel required to display some performative hostility or divisiveness against other Leftists.

￠Perhaps it is because I am nay longer a completely committed vanguardist, but I believe that such institutions as guilds and soviets in the social sphere, and my own Union Council of Communist and Comrades' Parties and Court of Socialist Hearing in the political sphere, are perhaps essential. Their essential utility, just to point out the most important or observable effects, is negatively preventing the conditions for an out of control Cheka-state and its terrorsation of society through yezhovshchina, and positively, by extention, loosening those locks which preclude comradely discourse and communal organisation which pluralism allows. Some might say these developments are necessary to advance on the path to communism one day.

￠Making this exclusivist claim, especially on top of taking the unearned legacy of the Communist Party USA, does not bode well for my projects and their primary aim, which is to replace the isolation of vanguardist dogmatism with a fundamentally democratic, comradely, semi-plural (plural only for fellow socialists, of the state or social variety) structure which may hopefully rebuild communal- and self-governance on the Left.

￠'With the exception of... lands occupied by the United States and Canada... which are legitimately contested by other nations'. O, thy goodness be at stake!

￠In the words of one ,,Comrade Peterson'', what do you mean by 'occupied', and 'legitimately', and 'concocted', and 'nations'? I mean this in seriousness. The answers will determine the legal status of the Quebec, New English, and like independence movements under an ACP-led regime. Will these nations be allowed to legitimately contest the ACP? Will their parties and organisations be recognised to be legal by the ACP? What if New England wishes to be a monarchy, even a member of the Commonwealth, or Quebec a fascist state, with le Pen as its Supreme Maréchaless of the Purified France and Colonies? What if Spain or Mexico engage in acts of subterfuge and meddling to conquer Texas and such territories, or to re-enslave New Amsterdam and New England to their yoke?

￠Either Article I is designed and will serve as a safeguard for liberty, or as a dodgy door-way to social-imperial tyranny.

Article I: Section II. Whilst the CPUSA continues to exist, I shall not, on the simple ground of comradery, be able to accept this claim that 'the American Communist Party is the official reconstitution of and successor to the historical Communist Party USA'.

￠I am glad to read the possible acknowledgement which may be represented by the word 'historical' in relation to which party the ACP is claiming the legitimacy and authority of. Still, I should have wished for the ACP to have merely claimed its superseding the CPUSA in representing socialism and the US and Canadian proletariat. Because the ACP insists on maintaining this claim to the authority of a currently existing party, there will remain a, for the moment, inert conflict. But what will happen to our comrades in the CPUSA if the ACP starts making gains, or makes the ultimate gain of state power? Is the potentially tragic future cost of this claim worth whatever its value is? And is this claim even all that valuable?

Article III: Section I. The only thing I have to say about the logo, besides pointing out its want of originality, is that it should have been a fun little thing to make the 'ACP' be in dark blue letters, matching the 'patriotic' æsthetic which the ACP is so fond of. Right now, the party's logo is using the colours of a party I know the ACP (really everyone) loathes being compared to. Two problems, one solution. Then again, until the United Farm Workers changes its flag and logo, the ACP's logo is hardly the most dubious-looking in this way.

Article IV: Section I. What is 'Marxism-Leninism'? Apologies, but I just had to. I do wonder, however, what this particular affirmation of ideology will ultimately entail, regarding prospective cadres' personal views.

Article IV: Section II. Now my above comment demonstrates its real pertinence. What, in the ACP's understanding, is the somewhat shroudly ideology of 'Marxism-Leninism'? This section does give some clue to the answer, but it seems to me to be sloppy for the 'scientific' constitution of 'the vanguard party'. This is yet another section which could expand the theoretical horizon of the party, or it could be an opaque justification for dogmatic ,,discipline'' of the newly stale type. It depends on the original intent and how it comes to be interpreted in time.

￠Perhaps it is only my scepticism, but how may one determine which theoretical contributions have 'made a novel contribution to the development of history' within a remotely recent window? From my view, you should have to wait fifty to one-hundred years before being able to judge the general importance of a contribution of any given thing in history. For instance, Comrade Deng's policies have not yet passed this historical threshold; it is still too soon. We must not try to solve an equation only with the first half.

￠A question is thus raised: what is the role and duty of a vanguard party in determining the utility of new theories? How can a vanguard party justly determine this, and ought it to do so prior to the fifty or one-hundred year period I designated? I should say that it is unrealistic to expect a vanguard party to be able to do this, and would harm the movement more than any aid it could render. It is rather the duty of the cultured, constructive intelligentsia (absolutely not the post-modern deconstructivists) to examine and debate such questions, with their results trickling down to parties and organisations organically. This is also how party intellectuals ought to function, but with a firmer party-specified/assigned subject or question focus.

￠The only subject of theory which parties and organisations probably need to be involved in is organisational theory, which of course impacts these institutions directly. However, organsational theory does not entail ideological or political theory in its entirety, but those areas influenced by them.

Article IV: Section III. 'A unified tendency of Marxism-Leninism': I have nay idea what a 'unified tendency' means, and it seems to be in conflict with such a diverse ideology as Marxism-Leninism. I suppose that 'unified' could mean open or universal?

￠I am most happy to see that the party 'rejects dogmatic, sectarian, and doctrinaire interpretations'. It is quite a shame that such a stated sentiment can be singled out for commendation, but the modern Left has made it so. I verily hope that the ACP means to remain faithful to the spirit of this text, and has not added it as a pre-emptive weapon to censor ideological disputes. It depends how this section is interpreted and utilised.

Article V: Section I. When I first saw this article, I assumed that 'executive board' was just the 'patriotic' corporate American equivalent of the politbüro, and thus is the permanent sitting body which reports to the central committee. Thankfully, I chose to peak ahead, only to discover that the ACP utilises all three bodies, this Board, a Politbüro, and Central Committee. Personally, I am not sure that I see the point in having three wheels, but this is based on a cynical fear that they will be too closely inter-locked to make a difference as a legal balance.

￠It was this article, of its kind, which I was not quite ready, in my learing of legal structures and rules, to comment on. I will try my best to say something useful, but with this caution that I ought to return one day to analyse this part of the constitution, when I am better learned in such affairs.

Article V: Section 1A. Having every member possess a definite role/office, akin to the Sovnarkom, seems a bit unnecessary and could increase the chances of internal conflict relating to overlap. Such a system will also cause problems relating to specialisation. Instead of having whichever Executive Boardman is available meet with a dignitary/party leader, it will have to be the International Secretary. This not only strongly empowers the holders of these roles at the expence of the Board, Party, and operation of collective leadership itself, but it impoverishes the skill-set of the Board. Ministerial portfolios are fit for kommissariats of state, not for (collective!) party leadership.

￠Not to mention that, once a role needs replacement filling, it will in the mean-time disrupt the efficiency of said role's domain, and could ignite squabbling, personal or factional, over the replacement proceedings for a given role. Too high a cost for too many handicaps, in my view.

Article V: Section 1B. 'The duty of the Executive Chairman is to execute the will of the Executive Board, lower party bodies, and all membership': what does this mean, and what is the actual, mechanical chain of checks here? Can this Executive Chairman use the 'will of all membership' to purge the rest of the Board? I am uncomfortable with the rhetoric employed; it sounds too (potentially) Yezhovistic.

Article V: Section 1C. 'Reports' is imperative in this section. The Central Committee and Party Congresses must be the institutions to set the goals of the Party. Hopefully, naybody ever tries to reinterpret 'reports' in a broader way, or this section as presently worded may constitute a problem.

Article V: Section 1D. 'The goals of the Executive Board will be established through close communication, consultation, and dialogue': I do not know what this means in the practical, legal sense. This section could have at least given a maximum time-limit before another 'communication, consultation, and dialogue' must be held. Better yet, and what my Reading Club actually did, it could have just spelt out a requirement for monthly meetings for the leadership bodies and annual meetings for the general body. ￠The want of real specificity raises the useful question, if all the leaders of the ACP were arrested or died of some plague to-morrow (do not scoff, many Bolsheviks did die of typhus, influenza, consumption, and now Covid, especially during the Entente blockade), should a new leadership be able to understand better than me what the constitution here intends to be done? Could this new leadership, were it raised from the very base, the bottom of the rank and file of the Party, use the 'manual' as provided in this constitution to accurately rebuild the party and successfully operate it? That is the question.

￠Actually, I wish to bring up something else relating to the paragraph prior to the last. One of the reasons my Reading Club, though not a Marxist organisation, found it prudent to establish a monthly and annual set-scheduling for leadership planning and Club administration, was simply to institute some internal discipline through habituation. A Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, one of whose defining characteristics is stringent party discipline, ought to be completely in favour of this, is it not so? As something of a 'conservative Anglo-Yankee soviet communalist', I should also support such a kind of (albeit preferably social) discipline, which I view as an absolute necessity for the ultimate transition to communism.

￠Whilst socialism is well and good, it is only the morphine of the masses: it is a temporary relief of misery, as such, a corrosively addictive substitute for the true cure. Better than opium, lesser than communism. I guarantee that there are some fools in this world who believe laudanum itself to be a cure, so my concern is valid; and we have seen the historical hesitation to begin the transition to communism, substituting socialist phenomena as somehow qualitatively equivalent. Communism is the sole cure to the plague of class and state. Soviet communism is when the dictatorship of the state becomes a laughable relic of ancient tyranny to the whole society. This includes, I implore the reminder, such covert arms of the state as the ,,education system'' which is really a redneck propaganda system to make good little Hunnish Fußsoldaten (where Warsaw and Bayern control all).

￠Communism is nothing less than the democratic beginning of history, where history has been frozen since the diminution of Athens by Macedon, the archetypal Jörmungandrstaat (Hobbes' Leviathan and Parenti's Capitular Octopus), which is simply the state itself, the weaponised class for the terrorisation of others.

￠I sincerely hope that the ACP knows this, but in Disclosnost, I have my doubts. The leadership seems to be a bit short-sighted in this matter. This constitution could certainly impact many things, more than just the party, at any rate.

￠I will end this mild tangent by emphasising the oft forgot caution that discipline is not created by strict, fearsome deference to the Party Line. Any party which mistakes it for such is already on the way to yezhovshchina.

Article V: Section 1E. 'Subject to contestation by the Central Committee': good to hear. The Executive Board could easily out-grow its established prerogative at such a small number of seats. Howbeit, I cannot help but notice that, again, whilst a procedure is called upon, the actual details of said procedure, including the necessary conditions to trigger it, is not to be found here. This causes a problem which, I apologise for consistently repeating (were it not such a serious concern), could lead to yezhovshchina. If this procedure should not find a fully detailed spelling prior to any sort of big event, debate, controversy, et cetera for the Party, then the result is likely to be devastating.

￠Focusing in on the one condition given, how can an antagonistic (not hostile, do mark) Central Committee and Executive Board come to a mutually acknowledged agreement on the meaning of 'to whatever extent... unable to fulfil... goals'? Does the Executive Board have any decisive autonomy, or is it meant to be a totally subordinate, smaller extension of the Central Committee? But in Article V: Section I, the Constitution states that 'the Executive Board is the highest organ of power'.

￠Another seeming contradiction caused by this same section is that 'the more contentious a given decision by the Executive Board, the more it is incumbent upon the Executive Board to properly consult with lower bodies of Party leadership'. So, the Ceontral Committee is a lower body than the Executive Board, but still has the authority, seemingly, to determine whether the Executive Board is 'to whatever extent not fulfilling Party goals', in paraphrase.

￠My fundamental concern, the contention I am laying out, is that this apparent contradiction may be, or may become, anywise, a sneaky method to ensure the entrenched supremacy of the Executive Board, for if any contestation requires the initial agreement of the Executivbe Board to initiate the procedure, then we have a case of 'the Executive Board in its enquiry has discovered that the Executive Board faithfully upholds the will of the Party'.

￠My last point should be a repetition. If all high and middle ranking ACP leadership were arrested or executed to-morrow (as happened consistently to the KPD), could the average ACP members use this Constitution as a clear and comprehensive instruction manual from which to rebuild the Party? This must be a question which we consistently measure each part and process of the Constitution by.

Article V: Section 1G. 'Executes internal decisions by consensus': this is fine, so long as anything even moderately important still gets recorded in a vote. If decisions do not have votes recorded in the archives, then in times of Party debate and contrversy, this want of a record could exacerbate tensions, having nay way to ascertain the historical fact.

Article V: Section II. 'The Politbüro... is an extension of... the Executive Board': this seems to me like a problem, which also hollows out the point I thought the ACP was working towards by having three (distinct!) leadership bodies. I must first address what I thought the purpose was, which will make the problem apparent.

￠I thought, and had hoped, perhaps, that the ACP was aiming to establish a tripartite check and balance system, or a decentralisation of authorities (not necessarily a separation of powers, which I am personally undecided on) betwixt the Board, Politbüro, and Central Committee, increasing in basic authority with the respective body's size. Now that the Politbüro is revealed to just be a client body of the Board, a 'Little Sovnarkom', we have an imbalance in the bloc of votes.

￠This is worse than the procedure of the French estates, since at least the three estates were each autonomous; it was only that the First and Second Estate tended to correspond in their voting. But the ACP has inexplicably given the Executive Board another bloc vote through its subordinate puppet Politbüro. The Central Committee may be the largest, most democratic representative of the general Party will, but it will never be able to win in a contest with the practically unified Boardbüro double-bloc.

￠I can understand and accept the various reasonings for not adopting a separation of powers, but I find it a grave error not to maintain a check and balance system, whether or not it cascades with authority based on size. If, for whatever the reason, the ACP is absolutely opposed to a tripartite check and balance autonomy for all three bodies, then it should be best just to abolish the Executive Board and its client, the Politbüro, in favbour of a unitary Central Committee answerable to the National Congress. The Central Committee, being the most democratic (or at least most republican) body, ought to be the body to retain authority in accordance with the principle of collective leadership and proper responsibility.

￠Alternatively, the ACP could do what the Third Estate demanded be done: insituting voting by head as opposed to by bloc/body when it comes to inter-body affairs (namely disputes). But this does not wholly resolve the problem, since the Executive Board can still threaten and otherwise manipulate the Politbüro, being the body holding dominion over it. It is still better, if the ACP insists on this having this peculiar structure.

Article V: Section III. 'Is vested with the power of democratically overseeing... the Executive Board and... its deputies in the Politbüro': I have two things to say about this. The first thing is that this passage again affirms that the Politbüro is a subservient vassal-body whose delegates belong to or are appointed from the will and authority (if not the actual membership) of the Executive Board.

￠The second thing I will say is merely restating what we had just established a few section ago. The Central Committee cannot provide the democratic (republican) over-sight prerogative requested of it because of how the Constitution has structured and worded matters, as seen in the last few sections. This problem can be solved by abolishing the Politbüro or officially merging it into the Executive Board.

￠I have read through all of Section III, and naywhere did I find a right to recall Party leadership, a right to dissolve the sitting of a body, or a right to liquidate the whole current membership of a body, which makes the Central Committee seemingly toothless. 'The Executive Board is principally accountable to the Central Committee' means naything, as the Central Committee has little leverage in how the procedures and structures are currently set out to successfully compel the leadership to do any of this.

Article V: Section 3A. The 'minimal level of education' stipulation for Central Committee membership is concerning to me. It allows both dogmatism and cronyism, either of which could be utilised as a method of manipulating the composition of the Central Committee 'by the Secretary of Education', which is, let us be reminded, an Executive Board position. This is yet another problem that precludes effective democratic (republican) over-sight of the leadership by the Central Committee (depending on how this sub-section is interpreted and to what end is used).

￠As a defence of high culture and fine intellect, I could appreciate this article, so long as the degenerate education system, of, say, the Middle-West (where Mid-Western Marx is clearly based) is not used as the marker of educational excellence.

Article V: Section 3B,C,D. All three remaining sub-sections of Section III, with the possible exception of sub-section A noted, are good and commendable. Again, the Central Committee has nay way of enforcing sub-section D, and per a recurring problem, the Constitution gives nay definite times by which the leadership is obligated to fulfil its responsibilities, giving it an immediate and apparent loop-hole to exploit.

Article V: Section IV. '...Until the National Congress where a new, updated constitution will be ratified': so this Constitution is merely a provisional one? This could be one of three things, it could be a good thing; it could be an untrue thing; in the worst case, it could be a bad thing, resulting in a constitution worse that this provisional Constitution. I only wish the ACP had officially named it a 'Provisional Constitution', for the sake of clarity.

￠The National Convention was held in October 2024, and according to Article IX: Section I of this Constitution, the first National Congress must be held within the next two years. We shall see whether the ACP actually adopts a substantially improved constitution or not. It is to be hoped that, at the minimum, they revise or amend this Constitution at the National Congress, to eliminate some of the problems we have so far discovered, if the ACP decides that it does not wish to create 'a new updated constitution' after all.

Article V: Section V. '...Chapter can form only on the basis of... independent... initiative': I take this to be a measure against the leadership manipulating Party chapters, such as splitting, merging, gerrymandering, and so on, them? There were some accusations at the ACP's founding that the leadership was fabricating puppet chapters of the CPUSA (and potentially the PCUSA, though of this I am less sure), claiming that these chapters had defected (democratically) to the ACP, which was contested by the CPUSA. Regardless with what the truth is, it is good to see this addressed by the Constitution, providing a positive precedent against such things in the future.

￠'...[Chapters] are entitled to employ the maximum degree of creativity, experimentation, and ingenuity within reasonable limits': this is quite intriguing, yet also puzzling to understand certainly. The question is one of constitutional exegesis and intepretation, as with so many other passages in this Constitution. Hopefully the leadership/Party does not use 'reasonable limits' to suff out 'maximum degree[s] of creativity [et cetera]' should they not fancy something this leads to. We must see.

Article VII: Section 2A. Once more, we must wonder about the nature and sincerity of this 'experimental autonomy'. What is odder, however, it the addition of 'independently establishing democratic procedures'! I secretly hope that, outside of the democratic centralism stipulation, the ACP might allow chapters to do without the more 'stultifying' features of vanguardism. Though certainly unlikely, perhaps it could also mean a possibility for the adoption of a method of decision-making and organisation closer to that of the New English town-hall model of direct-democracy.

Article VII: Section 3A,B,C. It is good to see that the ACP has already laid out some guide-lines, dictating (and hopefully keeping under sensible control) how and when the leadership may legally intervene in the affairs of Party chapters. This also gives the chapters a point of precedent to appeal to against any unconstitutional actions of the leadership.

￠My only real concern relating to these sub-sections is regarding the historically-proved danger of matters considered 'confidential for security' becoming ever more encompassing, even to the point that the head cannot so much as produce an accurate account of the budget. There ought to be rules restraining the usage of 'Party security' as a justification for anything, with hard dead-lines/limits constitutionally stated. Multiple leadership bodies ought to be given access to matters deemed confidential, so intra-body mutual favouritism is not allowed to hide information in a corrupt manner. I do wonder if this Constitution will speak of an inspectorate or control commission.

Aritlce VII: Section IV. I take this section to mean, unlike the controversial practise of the Party of Communists USA, that the ACP will not be seizing individual cadres' social media accounts, but strictly maintain official ones in a collaborative capacity? This is good, and it is well to find it so demarcated in the Constitution.

Article VIII: Section I. Not to be a Peterson, but what is meant by 'Leninist'? Democratic centralism took multiple evolving forms, even under Comrade Lenin. Is the faction ban being retained as a core principle of democratic centralism? I certainly pray not!

Article VIII: Section II. Another very good thing, the Constitution here affirming that the Party ought indeed to be concerned with maintaining some conception of 'law, procedure, and governance within the Party'. However, I must confess my concern regarding the couching of it in the stipulation that 'a criterion of practical success' is considered 'the fundamental element' dictating the Party's accounting of its relation to law, procedure, and governance. This principle will be all the more crassly and dangersouly spelled out in Sections 2A, 2B, and 2C.

Article VIII: Section 2A. This whole section is most unwell, indeed it is very bad, and will potentially shew itself evil. Respect for lawful Party procedure is nay mere 'bourgeois formalism'. This is a dangerous, Yezhovite obsession, that 'practical results and... practical objectives [are] to be given a greater degree of importance'. This, unfortunately, adds some credence to Comrade Daniel Tutt's accusation that the Party may harbour a sociality of violence, 'that is violent and exclusive'.

￠Notice one thing here, that I do not take Comrade Tutt's side against the ACP; I fear that this section of the Constitution will serve as a justifiation both for Yezhovites inside the Party, and Wokerites (even Woke-Stalinists) outside of it. I have heard the forces of Woke tyranny— some of whom I counted my friends, but in the end did prove bitter traitors —that they ought to shoot Marxist-Leninists in the street and gas the truckers, to say nothing of what they fantastically design against Russia and China. I am on the side of free thought and New England against that of murder and tyranny. I feel afeard that thinking 'Die Gedanken sind frei' is soon to become a thought-crime.

Article VIII: Section 2B. 'Democracy is not to be regarded as a princle in and of itself': whilst I might agree with this, the previous and the forthcoming section have so distraught me that I am unwilling to trust the ACP in granting it this. Further, is not communism supposed to entail the transition to total direct-democracy? I understand that, as a provisional constitution, such a question falls much out of the scope of this Constitution's purview, but I believe it worth mentioning, at any rate.

Article VIII: Section 2C. It is this section and its kind which gives reasonable men, especially those of the intelligentsia, the perception that Haz is probably a thug, dreaming of said 'state of civil war' where he may act out his fantastical pretensions of being a Mongol Caliph son of The Hun in 'a strict militant chain of command'. Is it really any surprise that intellectuals like Comrade Tutt respond to this talk of civil war with 'go take our sons, and tell Haz the Hun that we are on our way'?

￠As a general rule, you do not speak of civil war, or any type of insurrectionary activity or events in public (unless you are not the group that did it, in which case it is usually fine to offer supportive coverage). Why was this added to the provisional constitution, of all documents? I might even suggest that, if the ACP leadership were absolutely set upon putting this section in the Constitution, it ought to have adopted it as a shadow section, off the record though still official.

Article VIII: Section 3. I strongly disagree with this and previous sections' dichotomy of outmoded 'dead legal formalism' contrasted to 'living demands of active organisation' (of the new type! we might add in sarcastic jest). Legal proceduralism, I must ardently protest, is not 'bourgeois law'. This is silly, nay, even stupid, and we now historically know to what a dangerous path this leads.

￠I was told that the ACP was Dengist: but Dengists should intimately understand and appreciate the importance of law, procedure, and formality, as Comrade Deng did. But this Constitution is calling for something that could be deemed 'anarcho-Stalinism' (or simply Maoism?), where the party is allowed to run rampant, unhinged by any method or process, and the constitution is reduced to a manifesto. In such conditions, the party ceases to meaningfully exist. Crazed students or tribal guerrillas seeking to kill every four-eyed cultured bureaucrat cannot comprise a communist party.

￠Not to unduly praise myself/TOAC, but this proves beyond reasonable doubt that the projects of Renewed Socialist Legality, and by extension New Socialist Constitutional Law is such an essential (re)discover for the Left.

￠Let me also state that there is a firm difference betwixt formalism and obscurantism in law. Burgher systems of law tend to emphasise the former, for obvious, class-based reasons. Communists absolutely must stand against the latter, but stand against it in favour of the former. Legal formalism and proceduralism ought to be the most refined under a socialist system, whilst remaining eminently clear, accessible to the proletariat, whose system it is.

Article VIII: Section IV. I agree with and support this section, though in the shadow of last and sections prior, I fear that the ACP will not actually abide by the respect and rights guaranteed herein to individual cadres. But the establishment of precedent is always positive.

￠Comrade al-Din has mentioned himself that 'public criticism of the Party may be permitted through... the Party journal'. As I have said, I am a subscriber to Red America, but besides two articles by Comrade Garrido, I have not had the time, alack, to read any articles which may be critical (if there are any such articles published yet). We must wait to see whether the ACP leadership will adhere to this promise of public criticism, or if the leadership will fall into a practise of strict censorship, dogmatism, and paranoia. I truly hope they fulfil the promise, much as the ICL's (Spartacists') paper does, to which, as I have already said, I am a happy patron.

Article VIII: Section 4A. I am very much in favour of comradely discourse, but not, per the policy of Disclosnost, at the cost of a significant, formidable critique. Even if, say, the Critique of Pure Hazery, or a certain poem highlighting the dogmatic arrogance of Comrade Carlos, turns out to be somewhat rude, I think that such matters ought to be handled with leniency and a level tempre. Comrade Stalin, as Comrade Lenin himself pointed to, had trouble with this. Hopefully the ACP leadership will avoid the same error.

Article VIII: Section 4B. The two sentences of this section seem at odds. The first sentence allows Party leadership to dictate whether differences of opinion may be expressed within the Party, but the second sentence forbids suppression of internal debate. Internal debatye requires, is based on, differences of opinion. Ergo, either differences of opinion may not be suppressed as well, or the Pary leadership may indeed suppress internal debate.

Article VIII: Section 7B. '...A strict zero-tolerance policy with regard to all lewd... obscene, and inappropriate displays and behaviours which offend the moral sensibilities of the people': this is an extremely subjective section, quite nebulous in specific meaning. Has not Christopher Helali (International Secretary ACP) potentially already violated this section, in crassly saying 'because they suck/like dick' on the official ACP Metal Gear Red podcast? If it is only physical, and not verbal 'displays and behaviours', then the word 'physical' ought to be added. If this is not the case, then at once, I move to reprimand Comrade Helali for this infraction against the Party's Constitution.

Article VIII: Section 7C. This section is not at all befitting a communist party. If 'national and religious sensibilities' are palpably backwards or cause harm to others, then 'offending' and 'provoking' such (anti-)sensibilities is completely justified; some may well argue it is the duty of communists to actively do so. If this section is about bigotry, then they ought to have just phrased it with their previous 'strict zero-tolerance policy' maxim that they used above in Sections 7A-7B.

Article VIII: Section VIII. Ah, a 'wreckers and spies' clause. I was not expecting that. The only criticism which I feel is fair to make, until we are able to see how the Party uses the section (and how often), is that 'conclusively found' is far too nebulous an explanation of procedure for such a serious offence. I should strongly prefer that the word 'trial' or 'court', or even 'tribunal' or 'deliberation' be added to this section. Otherwise, what is to stop the leadership from abusing this section, as was historically done to lethal impact?

Article IX: Section II. Small typographic/grammatical error fix first: it ought to be the plural 'criteria', rather than the singular 'criterion', or an could be inserted betwixt 'of' and 'objectively' instead to retain 'criterion'.

￠The second thing I will say is that I do hope there is a real mechanism for 'scrutinising the performance of Party leadership' at the National Congress, and more importantly, mechanisms to do something about it.

Article IX: Section III. Does 'ratifying' also include the right to draft a new constitution? It is such a fundamental formality that I feel it must be addressed for the sake of comprehensiveness.

Article IX: Section 4A. '...Automatically subject to a vote of no confidence': this sentence seems a bit backwards. Does not the motion to a vote of nay confidence signal said failure of the Party leadership? This 'objective criterion' sounds like an unfalsifiable propagandistic justification for the Party leadership. What is an 'automatic vote of nay confidence'? This is very odd.

Article IX: Section 4A(1). This is very good. This is what I wanted to see. Though, it is a bit odd that the Central Committee cannot actually recall individual leaders, having to always vote on liquidating the whole body of leaders. This appears to be a wasteful procedure born of a minor over-sight.

￠This goes to a fundamentally deeper issue at play, namely that all constitutions ought to and usually do come released with some sort of commentary by said constitution's principal author(s). To my knowledge, the ACP leadership has published nay such document. Thus I, every commentator, every cadre, everyone, will have to continue guessing at the meaning and purpose of every article in this document, interpreting through and applying constitutional law.

Article IX: Section 4B(1). This concentrated authority being made to remain so insular just increases by objection that the Executive Board seems unnecessary, and personally feels like it may be a ratty stratagem by the current sitting leadership to avoid any subjection of itself to answerable procedures, id est, to avoid or lessen any possibilities of removal (a framers' statch/putsch, if you like). I stand by my affirmation that the Board ought to be abolished at the first National Congress.

Article IX: Section 4B(2). I hope that it is meant to remain implied that singular nominees to a position do not automatically become appointed if there is nay contest, that they do indeed still need to face election, if only as a matter of formality, in the Central Committee? If (when) the Party suffers a period of demoralisation, safeguards such as elections will help to stave off uncaring resignation and careless inertia during said periods. The fulfilling importance and intellectual excitement of an election could be just the thing to restore spirits and commitments in the Party.

Article IX: Section 4B(3). This is bad. I fear that self-nomination will further insulate and ossify the leadership body. Voting on one's own motion is fine, due to the low concentration of authority this entails, and is therefore hardly able to effect a shift in outcome. Self-nomination is practically an imposition through authority.

Article IX: S4B(5). So former Executive Board members form yet another possibility for a revolving door, contributing to the three dangers of insulation, ossification, and concentration of authority, especially that of an informal nature.

Article IX: Section V. '...The National Congress... will serve as the voting body for the election of Executive Board members': it is good to have confirmed that at least one body of leadership will not just become appointed after an uncontested nomination, that the Executive Board members must legally face some wider body for election. It is even better than I was expecting, in having the National Congress, rather than the Central Comittee, hold the election.

Article IX: Section VII. Excellent. Hopefully it is made mandatory for these reports and such to be created and sent physically/materially. Some organisations are becoming lax in the most trivial discipline, foregoing a physical central archive in real-space, thus losing all their documents— literally their party/organisation history for small groups —to the nebulous fiction of cyber-,,space''. Black-holes and fire-pits are far more real and properly materialist, still resulting in the same outcome!

Article IX: Section VIII. Again, what does 'close dialogue, communication, and consultation' fundamentally, materially mean? Time-table schedules serve to ground the requirement for consultation, most usefully being those of a set schedule. But we have already discussed this Constitution's weakness in its want of set schedules, time-tables, and dead-lines.

￠I dislike and mistrust the authority of Constitutional amendment being so vested with the Executive Board. Such an important and powerful prerogative ought to be held by the Central Committee instead, if not by the National Congress itself as the leadership/legislative body most representative of the Party's general will. Constitutional authority must at some point in the line return to reside with the Folk.

Article IX: Section IX. Good to see that any kind of amendment legally requires a vote to be called for it, and in the National Congress, nay less.

Article IX: Section X. I am unsure how I feel about this, for it seems unwise. Presumably, the Central Committee should chuse to dissolve the sitting body of the Executive Board for sufficiently serious infractions. Is it really safe to allow these obstruent members to retain authority as the Executive Board, knowing they have lost confidence and that their days are numbered? What is to stop this Board from becoming disgruntled and so engaging in a secret rogue campaign of wrecking, whether against the Central Committee exculsively, or against the Party as a whole?

￠Again, allowing the Central Committee to remove individual Board members rather than having to liquidate the whole sitting body should solve this problem; the problem might also be solved by allowing the Central Committee to grant the Politbüro the powers of the Executive Board until the next election.

Article X: Section II. Typographical error: the Executive Board is mentioned twice, the second time lacking proper capitalisation and placed in extraneous parentheses.

Article Section 2B. Interesting, having indivuduals serve as sponsors and educators for their own suggested member candidacies. As I understand, The Part of Communists USA just has braches employ a single district organiser to be responisble for candidate members' introduction/education. The American Party of Labor, cultishly, in my view, has initiatory struggle sessions, where its leadership interrogates (rather grills and scorns) a cadre. I do wonder if this might unfairly tarnish an unlucky sponsor's reputation, if they for instance accidentally sponsor a police-spy (as Comrade Lenin himself was fooled by Roman Malinovsky), or if their candidate turns out to strongly disgree with the Party Line and/or leadership? A question in some sense of 'the sins of the father' it seems, but inverted as the sins of the son (candidate member) to be reflected against the father.

Article X: Section VII. 'Any chapter may recall its executive or appointments to committees at any time by a vote': o how glad am I to see that the Constitution does actually provide an always-available recall function! Whilst the Constitution may not make mention of an inspectorate or control commission, the recall function I consider the most important of these.

Article X: Section VIII. It is good to see at least some judicial rights and protocol detailed in the Constitution, even if it is not as systematically thorough as one should like.

Article XI: Section II. Ah ya, the novel internal Party economy. I actually support the ACP's plan to develop Party businesses and co-operatives. Hopefully, the Party will one day come to have its own, controlled market, whereby it will be able to influence the outside capitalist market, without itself being influenced.

￠Political power does not, at the initial step, grow out of the barrel of a gun. It first grows out of the ore veins which are mined, it is heated at the processor furnace, it is then shaped in the mould, and only then, on the assembly line, is political power assembled as the barrel of a gun, after which it is sold at stores and armouries, sometimes including the political power! I believe that the Party leadership understands this, hence the novel internal economic policy (which will also give the Party cadres material experience in economic affairs, which might be important... since socialism is an economic system).

Article XI: Section V. Good to see a formal, consistent schedule set for these financial reports.

Article XII. This article seems fine, though upon it and the next article I feel less qualified to render sufficiently knowledgeable comment. It is always good to see judicial disciplinary procedure formally codified in the constitution of an organisation, not being left to personal, ad hoc authorities. The rights to press charges, to subpoena witnesses, and to testify generally are all good to see enumerated in formal codification as well.

Article XIII. I am not technologically informed enough to go into depth on this 'block-chain' system, except to say that it does not sound like a digital currency or a social credit-system, as various critics of the ACP have claimed. If I understand rightly, it is more akin to an identification token system, to verify identities and such.

￠All I will critically say is that Section III's 'pursue all legal remedies' is a bit of a cause for concern, seeing how suit-happy (thus how pro-burgher state law) the Party of Communists USA has been. I hope the ACP shews more restraint before collaborating with burgher state law (if it intends to do so).

Article XIV. It is good to have 'in writing' stipulated for these financial reports, which presumably means in a physical, material medium (paper and ink), rather than a fictitious projection from cyber-,,space''; I believe the Stirnerists call it a 'spook', and they should be correct in this.